'In God we trust'Islamism in the capitalist world-system
Please refer to this article as follows: (c) Marleen Renders, 2002. Since a couple of decades, but even more so after the fall of the Berlin Wall, interest and attention has grown among policymakers and students of politics for emerging movements that use a culturally flavoured, identitarian discourse. This is also the case in African politics. In states with a Muslim population, Islam gets more attention as a political factor than it used to do. The rhetoric and ideology of nationalism and socialism used to be prominent in the political discourse of ruling class and opposition alike. Now these ideologies seem to have lost a great deal of their legitimacy and credibility amongst the population to the benefit of Islamist movements. I will use the term Islamist for persons or groups using Islam (or their interpretation thereof) as a political ideology. Islamism as ideology - although it has its roots in nineteenth century Arab thought - essentially became important as an opposition movement against post-independence regimes through movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Governments in their turn, reacted to the new opposition discourse with an Islamisation of their own discourse whilst keeping intact the content of their policies. They took to actively seeking involvement in religious affairs such as the construction of state-controlled mosques and the appointment of imams, according them the status of civil servants (Rosefsky-Wickham 1997 : 124). The result is a seemingly unified discourse and universalised use of Islamic symbolism which tends to conceal what is underneath the surface. This has created a great deal of confusion amongst outside observers in the sense that they do not make a distinction between different forces in society using the same religious discourse. An example of this approach is the Clash of Civilisations approach of Samuel Huntington. According to Huntington, ‘civilisations’ – for example 'Islamic' or 'western' civilisation - are the highest levels of cultural identity. Such cultural identities are bound to collide: ‘civilisational commonality' will replace the old ideological cleavages, which leads him to observe that 'the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations has bloody borders' (Huntington 1993 : 35). This conceptualisation of identity and culture is rather essentialist and unimaginative. It blurs the real issues and cleavages. How can the use of cultural discourse as a means of protest be analysed in a framework that allows for a more profound analysis, taking into account the broader global political and economic context? Why is discontent and resistance voiced by means of culture? How can one at the same time supersede sweeping generalisations like Huntington's and avoid slipping into unconstructive particularisms, researching many cases in isolation without actually making sense of them in a larger context? One attempt to make sense of the phenomenon in a broader frame of analysis is made by Immanuel Wallerstein. I will discuss this approach in relation to Islamism throughout the rest of this paper: first by looking at Wallerstein's approach of cultural movements and at the conceptualisation of 'culture' in his work. For Wallerstein 'globalisation' is not a new thing, economically or 'culturally'. The capitalist world-system has been there since the 15th century, spanning the entire globe by the year 1900. 'Culture' in the capitalist world-system has a function in the process of socialisation and even domestication, as reflected in Wallerstein's concept of the 'liberal geoculture'. The liberal geo-culture is the cultural framework in which the capitalist world-system operates: basically it exists to legitimise it. How does this work? In Unthinking the Social Sciences (Wallerstein 1991a) Wallerstein describes how the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French revolution essentially constituted an adaptation of philosophy and epistemology to capitalism as the new historical system, the new mode of production. The new thinking introduced a linear instead of a cyclical worldview and, most importantly, it introduced the 'one society assumption' to go together with the world-economy increasingly stretching over the entire globe. This progress-and-universalism innovation had a profound influence on the social sciences. Scientism ultimately boiled down to the belief that it was possible for man to build the good society based on objective data and through rational measures. These measures were universal and valid for all societies, societies that were - or were to be - embodied by states. Thus the idea of development was introduced: societies could and should develop to become modernised, affluent states, endowed with the same level of material wealth as Western states. They were sure to attain the superior state of development - to catch up with the west - provided they followed the right path and worked hard enough. Yet, as pointed out by Wallerstein and many others, the fact that some countries are rich and others poor is not merely a matter of timing along some universal pathway to affluence. On the contrary: rich and poor are functional parts of one system and they are experiencing different processes within that system. The liberal geo-culture in the conception of Wallerstein has to conceal the latter process (Wallerstein 1991b). It serves essentially as a method to keep expectations intact for aspiring groups and societies in a system with limited re-distributional capacity. Culture here has to explain why inequality persisted. It explains why certain states did not 'develop' as quickly as others or not at all – it was due to the culture of a particular society, which could be 'backward', 'primitive' or in any case it had not yet reached the stage of complexity that was a prerequisite for capitalist economic development. This implied that states had to westernise to some degree. 'Culture' also serves to create and maintain the cadres for the ever-expanding world-system: culture in this sense is a status symbol indicating that some individuals had reached civilisation and others hadn't. The évolués who had, at least seemed one step closer to the civilisation and therefore the promise of material wealth of the civilised and developed nations. In this way, the centre of the world-system assures itself of the co-operation of elites in the peripheral zones. On the one hand the liberal geo-culture proclaims universalist values and truths, on the other hand it is based on racist and sexist categorisation. Both incorporation and division, formal equality and stratification in a symbiosis particular to the geo-culture can be activated according to the changing needs of the system. Even movements, which challenged the uneven distribution of surplus within the capitalist world-system, fell into the ideological trap of the liberal geo-culture: socialism as well as nationalism used the same premises as the ruling classes in their struggle against injustice. Their first aim was to conquer state power. As soon as this was acquired, they went on to pursue the goal of national development. The nationalist movement's elites focussed on catching up: social justice would automatically come later because scarcity would be eliminated altogether. They also took to assimilating to the culture of the former coloniser in both meanings: cultural westernisation in thought and appearance and perceived adherence to a global elite-culture (Wallerstein 1995 : 241). Culturally inspired movements do not do this, however. What can be the implications of such positioning? I will take a closer look at the Islamist phenomenon. Islamism does not have a unified clear fixed ideology. Islamist groups, parties, militants and politicians in different national and international contexts make for a wide spectrum of convictions, beliefs, analyses and praxis. There is no more or less unanimous position on issues such as running the economy, education, social services foreign policy or what so ever. Yet, there do exist some themes on which all Islamists principally agree, albeit not to the same degree or via the same course of action. They all claim to want to establish an Islamic society (and ultimately an Islamic state) through the assertion of the supreme sovereignty of God with the shari’a as fundament of legislation. Secondly, they reject or take a critical position towards what we call modernity and development. By rejecting modernisation and development - ánd the governments which are perceived to be an emanation thereof, Western or African alike - Islamism potentially affects what Wallerstein has identified as the ideological lubricant of the capitalist world-system. Will it perhaps also affect the capitalist system itself? Drawing on the analysis of the influential French researcher François Burgat one is bound to assume that it certainly does have some potential to that effect. Avant d'être céleste, la loi de Dieu est endogène: Burgat points out that Islamism is not so much about religion as about a liberation struggle (Burgat 1996 : 76). Modernisation, westernisation and secularisation brought about the destruction of the symbolic universe of the colonised Muslims. Formal independence did not restore it, moreover, the modernisation and secularisation process even deepened under the new administrations, whilst social inequality increased. Whereas modernity has a ring of ‘liberation’ and ‘emancipation’ to western and certainly to Franco-European ears, this is not always the case for people in ex-European colonies. The same goes for concepts like 'democracy'. None of the Islamic movements are ‘democratic’ in the sense that they would agree with the sovereignty of ‘the people’. Yet, claims Burgat, they would agree with varying degrees of political participation, which could in some cases very well attain Western standards. The resistance against western democracy stems for a great deal from the bad example set by the Arab governments who left no occasion to discredit it. What they call democracy is a caricature in the perception of the people living under these regimes, says Burgat. The Islamists in fact might want to reclaim the concept of political participation and give it the progressive and emancipatory content it does not have for them now. According to this analysis, Islamist cultural resistance seems to share some of the aspirations of the nationalist movement, wanting to liberate a people from foreign oppression. But they go much further than the nationalists and pursue liberation on a deeper level. The fact that what is called a national liberation struggle is not a liberation struggle an sich was already pointed out by the Algerian theorist and practitioner Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1961). Fanon accused the elites of the independence movements to have merely inherited the dominant position of the former colonial masters. In fact they use identical structures of domination and exploitation. The same argument is found in Wallerstein's work. By attacking structures of dominance rather than only the individuals who have dominant positions in that structure, a movement can effectively dismantle oppression, and become 'anti-systemic' (Wallerstein 1991c : 229). This is precisely what observers such as Burgat see the Islamists to be doing through cultural protest: creating an endogenous universe, a counter-modernity with a truly emancipatory content against western universalism, which is only delusion and deceit. Yet, the Islamist phenomenon, as mentioned, is multi-layered and consists of different groups with profoundly conflicting material interests. Leonard Binder pointed out that Islamism is more a matter of negative unity, not an organisation working towards a well defined goal, but rather a loose coalition of groups aiming at weakening the power of 'the state' or gaining a larger influence in it (Binder 1989 : 16). Yet, resistance against a particular authority or system does not necessarily have an emancipatory content. Islamist ideology and discourse is invoked by bourgeois factions, rural capitalists, petite bourgeoisie, lumpenproletariat and intelligentsia alike. As Islamism became more widespread, it became clear that there was more than one dynamic to it. It appeals to aspiring professional and commercial elites, which have built up parallel structures detached from state institutions, organisations and services. In Egypt, doctors, engineers and lawyers associations have been taken over by a younger generation of Islamist professionals. The main purpose of this new generation is not making revolution, but social mobility. Deprived of any realistic job prospects in a decaying state-run economy, they started to set up their own livelihoods. Young doctors got jobs in Islamic health centres and young engineers got employed by new small start up companies supported by the association. A whole professional underclass was looked after and helped by the Islamist networks, resulting in a considerable rise in their political leverage and the forging of a new modus vivendi with the state (Rousillon 1990 : 30). Islamic business and investment is on the rise, serving the material interests of a new middle and upper class, which is not necessarily Islamist, but rather part of what Ayubi calls a native mercantile capitalism (Ayubi 1995: 195). Islamism here is more a livelihood for an aspiring elite than an anti-systemic movement. In the slums of the big cities, the rollback of the state, especially in social service provision to poorer strata of the population, was conducive to its replacement with Islamist activity. In Egypt the gama'a al-islamiyya provided social services as well a sense of community. Moreover, they provided identity and self-esteem to people who had no prospect at all of participation in structures that might mediate and ameliorate the impact of larger politico-economic processes on world-system level. Getting the full weight of economic pressure and austerity measures on their shoulders, not having any political leverage or prospect of ever having it, Islamism as 'identity' felt like a way out for the dispossessed. A matter of 'we against the world', Islamism provided a mental but also a political and a geographical space for self-determination over which the state had no control. In these spaces Islamism developed another dynamic: former local youth gangs transformed themselves in local Islamist militias with a certain social prestige. Yet, their activities are increasingly linked to international criminal and Mafia networks and eventually have lost touch with the urban communities they originated from. As the Egyptian army was sent in to restore state control by force, the gamma'a islamiyya concluded that the only way forward was to return violence trough terrorist attacks on the 'symbols and figureheads of the state'; politicians, Christians and ultimately tourists. (Zemni 2001 : 228). In rural Algeria so-called 'armed Islamic groups' (GIAs) existing of radicalised young men have taken over entire villages and terrorise and tax the inhabitants. The groups are also accused of setting up roadblocks to racket passers by. The same is happening in the cities (Zemni 2000 : 35). It has been reported by various sources that the young men participating in these activities are not even all that religious or even interested in politics. The war seems to be about wealth and assets rather than about conflicting political ideas. Violence seems to be considered the only way by those without other means to get out of a desperate material and political situation. These stories and descriptions bare strong resemblance to the analysis of violence in for example Sierra Leone, Liberia or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Violence seems to be an end in itself, providing a fertile soil for different forms of legal and illegal trade with links to international organised crime. International Islamist organisations such as Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaida involve themselves with several wars and activities against what they call the enemies of Islam, but they don't have any project for an Islamic society or an Islamic state (Labevière 1999). Their Mafia-like activities and structures are imbedded in the structures of world-capitalism and are most certainly not contributing to do away with them, unless to replace them with an even more inegalitarian system with even less accountability. Violence however, remains a minority phenomenon amongst 'Islamists'. The point that I wanted to make was rather that Islamism represents different meanings and purposes for different people. As an ideology (I am not referring here to Islam as a religion), it is rather elusive. Islamism can definitely have an emancipatory and socially progressive content – many former socialists and communists turned to Islamism to further the cause of weaker members of society. But the Egyptian middle classes do not use an Islamist discourse for the same purpose as the Algerian GIA warriors. Tunisian intellectuals don't use Islamist discourse for the same reason as Osama Bin Laden. Therefore it is difficult to see how Islamism should be able to have enough meaningful anti-systemic content. Another way too look at it perhaps is to think of Islamism as an instrument, a vehicle for individuals trying to change something about their situation, a situation which determines their options and is shaped by the context of a larger world-system beyond their immediate control. Thus, Islamism can represent social containment, mobilisation, community or indeed a livelihood. Rather than considering Islamism as a movement, it might be useful to
try and analyse different Islamisms according to their position and activities
in relation to the capitalist world-system. Maybe the GIAs in Algeria have
(as a phenomenon) more in common with the RUF in Sierra Leone than with
the middle class Islamists in Egypt. And maybe reformist Islamist political
parties in countries like Tunesia have more in common with Christian democrat
parties in Europe. Let me go back to the initial question. How can one
analyse phenomena like Islamism in a meaningful way? We are in need of
a theory of the middle-range, where both field research on the analytical
and descriptive level can be combined with a more comprehensive outline.
Theories like world-systems analysis have to be tested and fine-tuned or
if necessary completely rebuilt or rejected. But in any case, they are
necessary, as they help us to reformulate questions on a higher conceptual
level. Thus, the imagined 'Clash of Civilisations' emerges as a powerful
ideological tool instrumentalised by George Bush Jr and Osama Bin Laden
alike. Both claim moral and civilisational superiority and to be fighting
for a just cause. But perhaps the real struggle lies elsewhere.
References
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